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  It has long been assumed that ownership of land gives farmers incentives to act as 
stewards  and  cultivate  land  in  a  manner  that  optimizes  long-term  returns  (e.g.  its 
intergenerational sustainability) (Gordon 1954, Perman et. al. 1999). Current modes of 
regulating  fish  farming  appear  to  reflect  this  assumption.  They  include,  inter  alia, 
granting  individual  producers  exclusive  rights  (subject  to  continuous  regulatory 
monitoring)  to  use  coastal,  lake  or  river  delta  locations  (Ransom  2007,  Scottish 
Executive  2003,  Scottish  Natural  Heritage  2002,  Sutherland  2000,  Highlands  and 
Islands Enterprise and The Scottish Office 1998, Hill and Ingersent 1977). The offer of 
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limited rights to operate in specific coastal locations was assumed to create stewardship 
incentives  parallel  to  those  of  land-based  owner-operated  farming.  The  implied 
expectation is that these quasi-property rights are sufficient to overcome fish farmers’ 
traditional act as stewardship orientation. On this point, for example, the UK Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution (2004, p.53) report on marine pollution notes: 
 “…the lack of property rights causes a strong divergence between the short term 
interests  of  fisherman  and  the  long  term  social  interest…(This  contrasts  with 
agriculture where)…property rights provide incentives to exercise stewardship to 
ensure the future fruitfulness of the land.” 
  Indeed, we would argue that because aquaculture is closer to fishing than agriculture, 
stewardship is highly sensitive to how property rights are specified (as is the case with 
natural resources of the marine environment in general, see for example Gordon 1954, 
Perman et. al. 1999 and numerous others).  
  The  possibility  that  property  rights  in  non-renewable  resource  does  not  ensure 
stewardship was initially argued by Hotelling (1931) who demonstrated that it may be 
“optimal” to harvest a resource to extinction. Clark (1990) has challenged this, arguing 
that extinction is highly improbable. However, Perman et. al. (1999) have sought to 
demonstrate  that  even  if  Hotelling  type  projections  are  wrong  (with  respect  to  the 
likelihood  of  extinction)  the  implications  of  his  model  are  still  quite  serious.  They 
emphasise  that  given  uncertainty  about  current  and/or  future  conditions  and  the 
interrelationships between species, it is possible that extension of property rights will 
create the perverse incentives identified by Hotelling (1931) and actually lead to the 
unintended collapse or extinction of populations (Perman et. al. 1999).  
  The aim of this paper is to contribute to research on the subject of stewardship of 
marine  resources.  We  offer  an  empirically  grounded  case  study  of  aquaculture  in 
Scotland  focussing  on  the  farmers’  perspectives  on  environmental  stewardship.  We 
chose  salmon  farming  because  of  the  controversy  surrounding  its  social  and 
environmental resource impacts (Hites et. al. 2004, Dillard et. al. 2005, Georgakopoulos 
2005, Georgakopoulos and Thomson 2005, 2006, Georgakopoulos et. al. 2006) as well 
as its political and economic importance in Scotland.  
  The first salmon farms were set up in Scotland about 30 years ago as largely owner-
managed  operations.  Along  with  those  in  Norway,  these  farms  enjoyed  first-mover 
advantage and were initially quite profitable. However, over the past decades, these 
producers  have  had  to  face  increasingly  international  competition  (and  concomitant 
price  pressures)  and  tighter  environmental  standards  as  problems  in  disease  control 
became apparent (Highlands and Islands Enterprise and The Scottish Office 1998). The 
result has been considerable structural change, with owner-managed operations taken-
over or merged with large foreign players. Currently the bulk of Scottish operations are 
branch plants of vertically integrated foreign conglomerates; very few small producers 
remain (Highlands and Islands Enterprise and The Scottish Office 1998). Currently the 
industry  is  under  attack  by  environmentalists  who  charge  that  it  is  ecologically 
destructive  and  damaging  to  health.  They  have  highlighted  the  potential  impacts  of 
chemical additives, of the potential health hazards arising from pollutants in salmon-
food,  from  chemical  residues  from  disease  and  parasite  treatments  and  from  the 
artificial flesh colouring pigments introduced to make farmed salmon flesh the same 
colour  as  that  of  wild  salmon.  Supporters  of  the  industry  argue  that  environmental   AGRICULTURAL ECO+OMICS REVIEW  18 
concerns are exaggerated and emphasise that salmon farming is a key industry in remote 
rural and island communities, that it provides a valuable alternative food source and a 
way  of  protecting  ever-declining  stocks  of  wild  salmon  (Scottish  Salmon  Growers 
Association - www.scottishsalmon.co.uk)  
  The  result  of  such  debate  has  been  that  the  subject  of  salmon  farming  has  been 
subject to a complex network of laws, regulations and voluntary certification schemes. 
However,  these  solutions  have  only  served  to  further  fuel  debate  culminating  in 
considerable disagreement on the ability of this regulatory regime to protect coastal eco-
systems  and  the  health  of  consumers  (Georgakopoulos  and  Thomson  2005).  Some 
within the industry have responded to the situation by investing in organic production 
methods.  Since  there  is  some  research  that  suggests  organic  producers  prioritize 
stewardship over profitability (Kassa et. al. 2002), we decided to make this group the 
focus of field research on stewardship in aquaculture. 
  Data were gathered via field research in Scotland with fish farmers who had switched 
from conventional to organic modes of production. By focussing on organic producers, 
the  research  followed  the  lead  of  previous  environmental  economics  research  that 
proposes  land-based  organic  producers  have  stronger  environmental  stewardship 
motives than conventional farmers. In using qualitative data, we follow the suggestion 
of Kassa et. al. (2002) and others (Denzin and Lincoln 2000, O’ Dwyer 2004 to name 
but few) that highlight the importance of shedding light on the perceptions and value 
orientations of those who exploit the resource directly.  
  The method of Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967) was used to analyse the 
data  and  construct  an  interpretation  of  the  Scottish  organic  salmon  farmer’s  value 
orientation.  The  results  of  that  effort  suggest  that  Scottish  organic  salmon  farmers 
construct  the  problem  of  production  and  resolve  it  in  ways  that  are  fundamentally 
different  to  land-based  organic  farmers.  Moreover,  the  specific  elements  of  their 
construction offers little support for the view that property rights automatically create 
incentives for stewardship of the marine environment.  
The remainder of the discussion is organised into three main sections. In the next 
section, the method of data collection and its analysis using the procedures of Grounded 
Theory are set out. This is followed by a discussion of the main findings of the research 
— an empirically Grounded ‘Theory’ or conjecture on the value orientation of Scottish 
organic salmon farmers. The last section situates our results in previous agricultural and 
environmental research on farming, property rights and stewardship.  
 
 
Section 1: Data Collection and Method of Analysis 
The aim of this section is to clarify the main features of the research including a brief 
description of data collection and a more extensive discussion of Grounded Theory, the 




A: Data Collection 
  The  data  analysed  consist  of  the  transcripts  of  interviews  with  Scottish  organic 
salmon  farmers  and  notes  taken  on  site  visits  including  details  of  the  researchers’   2008, Vol 9, +o 2  19 
experience of the environments in which the interviews were conducted. All of the 
interviews were carried out in the farmer’s work place and lasted between one and two 
hours. The experience of carrying out interviews in remote farm sites provided valuable 
insights  into  the  social  and  cultural  contexts  in  which  the  farmers’  environmental 
attitudes were forged.  
  Initially, a series of pilot interviews were undertaken and these interviews led to the 
selection of a particular salmon-farming region where organic salmon production is 
concentrated. 
  In the next step, subjects were identified who were willing to discuss, in detail and in 
depth, the particulars of their situation and the ‘solutions’ they saw to the problems they 
identified.  This  resulted  in  in-depth  interviews  with  the  representatives/owners  of 
organic and mainstream fish farms [1]. A range of external actors and stakeholders were 
also interviewed and these data were used to clarify the context of the views held by the 
fish  farmers  interviewed.  A  brief  description  of  the  interviewed  representative 
organisations of the Scottish salmon farming industry can be found in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Salmon farming organisations from which representatives were interviewed 
 
OS1, small family organic fish farm. 
OS2 small family organic fish farm. 
ML1 subsidiary multinational group producing conventional and organic salmon. 
ML2 subsidiary of multinational group producing conventional and organic salmon. 
TM1 subsidiary family run group producing conventional salmon. 
MK marketing company of TM1. 
MM large salmon UK company producing conventional and organic salmon. 
Sm large smolt producer. 
SMK a small salmon smoking company. 
SSGA – Scottish Salmon Growers Association running the Scottish Quality Salmon 
(SQS) product-labelling scheme. 
RGA– Regional Salmon Growers Association running the Regional Quality Salmon 
labelling schemes (RQS). 
 
Analysing Qualitative Data  
  Most research in agricultural economics, whether traditional or behavioural, assesses 
theory  by  reference  to  quantitative  data;  the  data  provide  empirical  proxies  for  the 
conceptual variables deduced from theory (Denzin and Lincoln 2000, Perman et. al. 
1999). In this respect, agricultural economics has been less open to qualitative methods, 
than perhaps research in subjects such as agribusiness studies, rural sociology and home 
economics  that  routinely  publish  work  in  which  qualitative  data  (e.g.  focus  groups, 
interviews, etc.) are the basis for conjectures and hypotheses on decision-making by 
actors in the agriculture sector. As argued by Kassa et. al. (2002) and others, qualitative   AGRICULTURAL ECO+OMICS REVIEW  20 
data are seen to be particularly useful for situations (problems and settings) that do not 
involve large numbers and concern conditions that are novel or not well understood 
(Guba and Lincoln 1989, Denzin and Lincoln 2000).  
  The  aim  of  our  research  was  to  use  interviews  as  the  basis  for  a  more  realistic 
portrayal of the value orientation of farmers. Rather than assuming that farmers are 
rational social actors who optimise according to incentives, such as property rights, we 
were interested in exploring, the social-psychological basis for farmers choices. Thus, 
in-depth interviews with organic and conventional salmon farmers aimed to bring to 
light greater depth of conceptual understanding regarding farmers’ perception of their 
situation  and  the  importance  (if  any)  given  to  environmental  stewardship.  We  were 
especially interested in any contrast that might arise between land-based and marine-
based organic farming because previous research claimed that organic producers could 
be expected to have a different value orientation towards environmental protection. 
  Grounded Theory is a method for analysing qualitative data that is particularly suited 
to studies of this type because the method is highly focused on the social-psychology of 
the actors studied (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Glaser 1978, 1992, 2001 and 2004). This 
means that data are analysed solely in terms of their bearing on interpreting the actor’s 
problem and the ways in which he or she resolves the problem.  
  The method of Grounded Theory makes certain assumptions about qualitative data, 
described  by  Van  Maanen  (1979)  as  first  and  second  order  findings.  Accordingly, 
interview materials can be described as first order findings rather than ‘data’ in order to 
emphasise  that  these  materials  consist  of  the  interpretations  made  by  different 
individuals playing the same socio-economic role (e.g. salmon fish farmer). It is to be 
expected  that  their  interpretations  of  similar  economic  situations  will  differ  if  only 
because what is the same role, from an economist’s standpoint, is not played out in 
identical circumstances. At this level, the issue facing the researcher is not the ‘truth’ or 
plausibility of the various opinions recorded in the interviews but the extent to which 
they can be aggregated (or synthesised) into a representation of the farmer’s problem 
that  would  be  recognizable  to  the  informants  themselves  (Glaser  and  Strauss  1967; 
pp.122).  When  aggregation  is  achieved,  what  others  usually  call  the  (empirically) 
Grounded Theory of the actors problem, is described by Van Maanen (1979), as the 
‘second-order’ finding. Van Maanen’s (1979) usage clarifies that a Grounded Theory is 
itself a representation (interpretation or theorisation) of the informants’ problem based 
on a particular way of aggregating the first order representations of that problem made 
by the informants themselves. 
  Aggregation (of theoretical synthesis) can be said to be achieved through fixed steps 
in which abductive inference is made from the data being analysed (Ciancanelli and 
Pastra  2006).  Reliance  on  abduction,  rather  than  induction,  is  the  main  difference 
between the classic Grounded Theory method and other methods of qualitative data 
analysis (Glaser 2004, Ciancanelli and Pastra 2006).  
  The  difference  between  inference  via  induction,  deduction  and  abduction  can  be 
illustrated by considering the following illustration. Deduction infers the unknown from 
the known (or what is taken to be true). For example, if all beans from this bag are 
white (the Rule) and these beans are from this bag (the Case), then these beans must be 
white (The inferred ‘result’ or conclusion). It can be shown that induction and abduction 
do not move between these three elements of reasoning (rule, case and conclusion) in 
the same way as in deduction. Inductive inference starts from the specific case “the   2008, Vol 9, +o 2  21 
beans are from this bag” then moves to the conclusion “these beans are white and from 
these ‘givens’ infers the ‘rule’ or generalisation “all the beans in that bag are white”. 
Abductive inference moves from the rule, “all beans in this bag are white” to the result 
“these beans are white” and from rule and conclusion infers the properties of the case 
“these beans are from this bag.” Wirth (1998) describes abduction as “inference to the 
best explanation” to highlight its difference from induction which is “inference of the 
rule (generalisation) from particular cases.  
  In the classic Grounded Theory method, the analysis of data is referred to as coding. 
Coding is an iterative procedure in which concepts and categories that best explain the 
common factors in the data are inferred. The aim is to find concepts that aggregate the 
particular complaints, proposals and representations of the social situation articulated in 
the interviews in order to clarify the underlying driver(s) of the farmer’s preoccupations. 
This is referred to as the core phenomena or central finding of the analysis. Because the 
raw materials analysed are the statements of those interviewed (rather than their actions) 
and because analysis itself is a series of thought experiments (abduction or inference to 
best explanation) [2], the central finding is described as a ‘theory’. It could just as easily 
be described as a conjecture or hypothesis and as such serve as the basis for more 
conventional empirical tests of its explanatory capacity (Strauss and Corbin 1990).  
  In light of these features of Grounded Theory, it must be clear that the intention is 
not to deliver statements regarding the objective ‘problem’ of organic salmon-farmers in 
Scotland. The question is not whether the theory is ‘true’ (supposing such a truth is 
possible)  but  whether  anything  can  be  learned  from  it  that  might  warrant  further 
investigation.  In  that  sense,  the  usefulness  of  the  theory  lies  in  its  contribution  to 
making sense of the motivation of organic fish farmers, as social actors, in order to 
ascertain its implications for environmental stewardship.  
 
 
Section 2: A Grounded Theory of Risk Construction  
  In the section that follows the Grounded Theory of the actor problem (second order 
findings) is outlined and illustrated with reference to specific examples drawn from 
(first order) interview findings. Our interpretation of the data proposes that the Scottish 
organic salmon farmers’ problem is grounded in ‘risk’ theory [3] and that this problem 
is resolved via the adoption of two quite different social-psychological strategies for 
managing risk: denial and affective bias.  
 
Denial 
  Denial  is  the  first  risk  management  strategy  identified  in  the  analysis  of  the 
interviews. Denial is a commonplace defence mechanism in which social actors insist 
that certain facts are not true—despite significant evidence to the contrary (Freud 1937, 
Paulhus et. al. 1997). Farmers use this strategy primarily in relation to the possible 
adverse impacts on the marine and coastal environment of their production practices.  
  Denial,  as  a  strategy  to  manage  risk,  manifests  itself  in  three  ways.  Firstly, 
informants sometimes denied the possibility altogether that fish farming could harm the 
environment.  
  “No environmental risk exists anyway because salmon are like canaries. They can 
only  grow  in  perfect  environmental  conditions.  It  is  self  defeating  to  pollute  the   AGRICULTURAL ECO+OMICS REVIEW  22 
sea/fresh-water  because  fish  will  not  grow  and  you  will  be  forced  out  of  business. 
Environmental groups seem to have forgotten this.” (SMK) 
  “Environmental  regulation  in  Scotland  is  financially  choking  the  salmon  farming 
industry  to  death  unnecessarily  because  the  industry  is  environmentally  friendly 
anyway.” (MM, SMK)  
  From a psychological perspective, denial of the possibility of harm provides the fish 
farmers with the greatest comfort. However, it is clearly maladaptive from a social 
standpoint. For this type of denial to be sustained, the farmers must engage in some sort 
of ‘lie’, either through misrepresentation of their own practices to others or by ignoring 
the often-observable polluting effects of their practices. Moreover, this type of denial 
can explain the often-intemperate reactions of fish farmers to environmentalists and 
other critics of aquaculture.  
  “Escaped farmed fish spawning in rivers have a positive impact on the wild salmon 
populations which have decreased due to environmental changes in the ocean.” (SMK) 
“Environmental groups are absolute nutcases ruining the public image of the industry 
for no good reason whatsoever.” (SSGA) 
  Through denial of impact, the farmers avoid having to think about (or make the effort 
to understand) how their conduct affects the environment and this can be seen as an 
indicator of ineffective stewardship of the marine environment. 
  A second form of denial is one in which farmers accept the possibility that fish 
farming may cause environmental harm but minimize its seriousness. 
  “The farmed stocks are only ten generations away from the wild and there is very 
few  genetic  improvement  that  can  be  done  from  one  generation  to  another  (4% 
improvement).” (SMK)… “If escaped farmed fish have some negative traits in them, 
they will not survive in the wild.” (SSGA)… “Escapees are very few but what about the 
risks posed by releasing fish in rivers by the Fishery Boards for wild stock enhancement 
purposes?” (MM) 
  “If there are environmental impacts, these are managed professionally in a positive 
manner.”  (ML1)…  “Environmental  impacts  existed  perhaps  in  the  past  because  the 
industry  did  not  have  the  technology,  the  science  and/or  the  appreciation  for  the 
environment. These things have changed now.” (ML2)… “In the past, fish farming was 
not  scientifically  grounded.  People  were  experimenting  and  for  that  reason 
environmental problems were created. The industry is a much better performer today, 
with  universal  technological  practises  in  Chile,  Norway,  Canada  and  Scotland  but 
because of its past practices there is a negative perception by environmental groups.” 
(SSGA) 
  In  some  cases,  the  fish  farmers  admit  to  the  seriousness  of  (at  least  some) 
environmental risks arising from their production practices but deny responsibility for 
it. For example, there was candid discussion of the environmental effects of sea lice 
infestations  arising  from  the  overcrowding  of  fish  cages.  However,  most  farmers 
rationalised the problem by arguing that it was not due to their practices.  
  “Environmental  risk  from  sea-lice  passing  from  farmed  to  wild  stocks  is  not 
proved…Wild salmon stocks had sea-lice problems even before the industry's initial 
setup, so the sector cannot be held responsible for those.” (OS2, Sm, SMK) 
  “The  salmon  farming  industry  did  not  create  sea-lice.  They  always  existed.  The 
Scottish  Executive  and  Scottish  Environment  Protection  Agency  (SEPA)  have 
acknowledged this. No regulation exists for sea-lice levels.” (SSGA)   2008, Vol 9, +o 2  23 
  A  second  feature  of  the  fish  farmer’s  construction  of  environmental  risk  is 
assignment to the regulator of ultimate responsibility for environmental damage. For 
example, all interviewees commented that Salmon farming is one of the most monitored 
and heavily regulated industries in Scotland, and as a result, its practices do not pose 
any environmental risks. Based on the assignment of responsibility to the regulator, 
farmers  reject  (often  vociferously)  any  criticisms  of  their  practices  made  by  non-
statutory  environmental  organisations,  on  grounds  that  the  regulator  permits  it  and 
would not do so if it were not environmentally safe. Typical quotes include: 
  “Risks  from  non  responsible  production  practices  exist  in  theory.  However  this 
cannot happen because SEPA monitors the industry closely.” (TM1, MK) 
  “Risk  of  operations  termination  by  SEPA  if  limitations  for  sea  lice  treatment  or 





  Research in economics as well as psychology has demonstrated that under conditions 
of uncertainty, decision making strategies are based on an individual’s ability to recall 
or imagine a probable event (Tversky and Kahneman 1973). However, accumulated 
empirical evidence from psychometric and social psychological investigations support 
the view that purely individual-based analysis is only part of risk perception and posit 
that there is a need to account for emotional responses and social aspects of trust to 
reduce complexity and manage risk (Kahneman et. al. 1982, National Research Council 
1989, Renn 1992, Royal Society 1992, Lupton 1999, Steele 2004, Zinn 2006). Based on 
this social psychological premise we advocate that the second strategy used by the fish 
farmers to manage risk is a version of affective theories of risk perception, sometimes 
referred to as affect heuristics.  
  Affect heuristics highlight the role of feelings in shaping risk perception (Lupton 
1999, Beck et. al. 1994, Sheldon and Golding 1992, Wynne 1989, 1996 and others). The 
central  idea  is  that  a  negative  emotional  disposition  towards  an  activity  provokes 
individuals  to  assign  it  high  risk  weighting.  As  a  social-psychological  strategy  to 
manage  risk,  our  subjects  used  it  primarily  in  relation  to  those  economic  structures 
(market structure, supply chains, etc) they must navigate in order to sustain their fish 
farms and their way of life.  
  As  a  coping  mechanism,  affect  heuristics  provide  rules  of  thumb  by  which  to 
rationalise behaviour. The direction of effect is from the informants’ feeling towards the 
object (say market competition) to their perceived risk-reward from engagement with 
the object.  
  Generally, organic producers do not see themselves as having significant, if any, 
negative environmental impacts partly because of the friendliness of their practices to 
the environment but mainly because of compliance to strict environmental regulation. In 
terms of regulation farmers reflect the following view:  
  “we are basically environmental friendly because we follow SEPAs regulation and 
monitoring of the industry.” (SSGA) 
  Fish farmers further evidenced a strong negative attitude towards market forces. It 
was indicated by all our interviewees that:   AGRICULTURAL ECO+OMICS REVIEW  24 
  “The industry has been facing overproduction and poor profitability issues at both 
national and international levels that make financial survival of both small and large 
scale fish farming corporations very difficult if possible at all. A situation that has been 
driving the increased levels of consolidation in the sector.” (SSGA) 
  This  negative  attitude  influences  producers’  perception  of  fish  farming  as  an 
extremely hazardous (highly risky) business offering very low rewards. For example 
producers commented that:  
  “The  mainstream  side  of  things  is  now  highly  unprofitable  with  the  selling  of 
conventional salmon being much lower than the production costs” (ML1)… “everyone 
in  the  industry  tries  to  cut  corners  and  out  do  its  neighbours”  (ML2)…  “without 
realising that this is self-defeating since the production costs can be cut in the beginning 
but then it becomes very difficult to further reduce. The solution is to bring the price up 
by controlling the volume of the output at industry's level and not to behave according 
to the economic expanding web graph based on previous years’ prices.” (SSGA) 
  The hallmark of this social-psychological mode of managing risk is the informants’ 
high estimation of the hazards and low estimation of the rewards of fish farming. For 
example producers indicated that: 
  “In the beginning of the sector (some twenty years ago) there were huge margins of 
profit to be made. However this is not the case anymore and all producers struggle to 
survive financially” (Sm)… “as a result some of them thought organic production could 
generate  the  required  turnover  and  because  of  appropriate  but  difficult  to  adopt  in 
general modes of production switched in organic fish without really considering any 
other but the economic issues.” (SSGA, OS1, OS2, ML1, ML2, MM) 
  The  implication  of  this  for  stewardship  is  high  estimates  of  hazard  that  support 
farmers’  indifference  to  environmental  protection  since  they  identify  themselves  as 
“underdogs” in the overall market situation. 
 
 
Section 3: Risk Perception and Stewardship 
  Fisher (1981) argued that much of the concern about resource exhaustion involved 
renewable resource use and the loss of biodiversity, having in mind mainly land-based 
organisms. Since then, however, significant evidence has accumulated that freshwater 
lakes,  streams  and  rivers,  rather  than  land-based  organisms,  are  probably  the  most 
threatened terrestrial ecosystems. Since marine waters contain over 90% of the world’s 
living biomass, the greatest threat to biodiversity arises from resource exhaustion of 
marine waters (WRI 1994).  
  In the past, resource exhaustion of marine waters has been due to the hunting or 
harvesting of particular species (such as Whales) for recreation or commercial purposes 
(Perman et. al. 1999). However, today the evidence suggests that a far greater threat is 
posed by pesticide intensive land farming, pollution and associated climate changes. 
Even those activities that aim to substitute marine cultivation for marine hunting and 
harvesting, such as salmon farming, are now thought to pose threats to biodiversity and 
the marine habitat (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 2004). 
  Unfortunately,  theory  development  in  environmental  economics  has  tended  to 
concentrate  its  attention  on  the  adverse  conditions  that  could  arise  from  the  over-
harvesting of species without exploring in sufficient detail other factors that contribute 
to the loss of biodiversity. For example, non-targeted species are sometimes casualties   2008, Vol 9, +o 2  25 
of aquaculture (Marine Stewardship Committee 2003, Scottish Natural Heritage 2002, 
Friends  of  the  Earth  Scotland  2001,  www.salmonfarmmonitor.org.).  Many  forms  of 
resource harvesting, particularly marine fishing (or aquaculture as indicated to us by 
local  environmental  groups)  directly  or  indirectly  reduce  stocks  of  other  plants  or 
animals that happen to be in the neighbourhood or which have some complementary 
relationship with the target resource (Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
2004, Perman et. al. 1999). 
  Mainstream  theories  of  commercial  resource  harvesting  have  tended  to  ignore 
Hotelling’s work and argue that extinction of renewable resource stocks is possible only 
in conditions of open access where the species in question are commercially valuable. 
However, if property rights are absent (implied open access), the incentives to conserve 
stocks for the future are weak. Thus, the main policy focus of environmental economic 
theory is construction of various quasi-property rights in the harvesting of resources on 
the  basis  that  such  rights  generate  environmental  stewardship  incentives  among  the 
harvesters  (Conrad  1995  and  Rettig  1995,  Clark  1990,  Conrad  and  Clark  1987, 
Dasgupta 1982 to name but a few).  
  Kassa et. al. (2002) is one of the few qualitative studies that explore the attitudes and 
motives of organic and conventional farmers. Their research suggests that organic and 
conventional  farmers  have  different  value  orientations  towards  stewardship.  In  their 
study,  conventional  farmers  believed  that  organic  production  was  undertaken  in  the 
mistaken belief that a higher return would be achieved because of the higher prices 
charged for organic outputs. However, their research indicates that organic producers’ 
primary  motive  for  adopting  organic  modes  of  production  was  concern  for  the 
environment.  
  Our  study  of  organic  salmon  farmers  suggests  that  organic  production  can  be 
motivated  by  a  profit  orientation  rather  than  an  environmental  one.  Thus,  it  offers 
material that can be used to assess the claims and counter-claims regarding the power of 
property rights to ensure sustainable modes of production. Our results suggest that when 
viewed in terms of risk management, the fish farmers’ problem is resolved by denial 
and  affective  bias.  Both  enable  farmers  to  transfer  environmental  stewardship 
responsibilities to regulatory organisations.  
  There is some justice in this stance. Scotland’s regulatory framework provides weak 
property rights when it structures quasi-property as leases (exclusive rights to the use) 
of  specific  locations  on  the  seabed  and  foreshore  property  (Royal  Commission  on 
Environmental Pollution 2004). Other countries such as New Zealand construct stronger 
property rights by extending fish farming rights that are permanent and transferable via 
sales in the open market (in strong contrast to Scotland where there is no market in 
leases). In the UK, the price of the lease is set by a public body (the Crown Estate) 
whose duty is to maximize its revenues earned from leasing (Scottish Executive 2003). 
This places Scottish fish farmers (whether organic or not) in a position analogous to 
land-based tenant farmers. Neither is able to appropriate the benefits that might arise 
from investments to maintain or improve the environment in which they cultivate.  
  The  leasing  arrangements  in  the  UK  give  farmers  incentives  for  short  run 
exploitation rather than long-term stewardship. Fish farmers in New Zealand, however, 
can appropriate the benefit of investments since they have permanent and transferable 
rights to fish farming locations. It is in their interest to act as stewards of the marine 
environment.  Thus,  it  should  not  be  surprising  that  UK  fish  farmers  assign   AGRICULTURAL ECO+OMICS REVIEW  26 
responsibility for environmental stewardship to the regulator and are preoccupied with 
income risk whilst seemingly indifferent to the risks to their environmental capital. The 
leasing arrangements limit the amount of their own money capital at risk; their fixed 
capital is composed mainly of “natural capital” (the marine environment in which the 
fish farms are situated) that is owned by someone else.  
 
 
Concluding Comments  
  Aquaculture is seen as a possible solution to three related problems in Europe: the 
exhaustion  of  fish  stocks  in  the  North  Sea,  the  limited  scope  for  investment  and 
employment in remote fishing areas affected by it, and fish as a source of ‘healthy’ 
food. However, the industry has been dogged by controversies about food safety and 
adverse  environmental  impacts  arising  from  intensive  aquaculture  practices 
(www.salmonfarmmonitor.org)  
  These controversies have highlighted the need for practices that minimize its social 
and  environmental  risks.  One  such  strategy  undertaken  in  Scotland  was  a  shift  to 
organic salmon farming, building upon the perceived success of organic land based 
agriculture. Organic aquaculture was seen to offer a commercially viable solution to the 
problems created by conventional fish farming (Sutherland 2000, Scottish Executive 
2003, ORGSAL 2000).  
  Surprisingly,  organic  practices  were  not  supported  by  environmental  protection 
groups. Indeed, some pressure groups have attacked organic salmon farming as equally 
environmentally threatening and unsustainable (see for example: FOE 2001; Scottish 
Natural  Heritage  2002;  Georgakopoulos  and  Thomson  2005;  Georgakopoulos  et  al 
2006; www.salmonfarmmonitor.org). 
  The application of Grounded Theory in this study provided a means to conceptualise 
how the fish farmer constructed the problem of environmental stewardship, drawing 
attention to its links to risk perception and risk management. As noted previously, the 
usefulness of this application lies, not in representing risk perception as an objective 
phenomenon, but in its ability to make sense of the motivation of fish farmers and the 
implications of that motivation for environmental stewardship.  
  Our findings suggest that organic fish farmers in Scotland adopt one of two strategies 
to manage risk: denial or affective bias (see for example Zinn 2006). In our judgement, 
these strategies are linked to the UK government’s failure to construct a property rights 
regime that encourages farmers to act as stewards of the marine environment.  
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0otes 
[1]  Twenty-three interviews were conducted with salmon farmers and representatives 
of their associations, regulators, political institutions, pro- and anti-fish farming 
stakeholders.  Documentary  analysis  included  FOE  (2001),  Scottish  Executive 
(2003) and SNH (2002). The specific regional location of the salmon farmers shall 
remain anonymous to respect the potential commercial sensitivity of data gathered. 
See  Georgakopoulos  and  Thomson  (2005,  2006),  and  Georgakopoulos  et.  al. 
(2006) for more information on the interview data and on the conceptualisation of 
the arena model (Renn 1992). 
[2]  In qualitative research, abductive inference is rarely referenced even though some 
widely used interview transcript analysis techniques, such as word mapping are 
derived  from  it.  However,  most  qualitative  data  analysis  employs  inductive 
inference,  including  automated  versions  of  it  found  in  qualitative  data  analysis 
software packages. 
[3]  By risk we do not refer to an objective feature of the farmers’ situation but their 
subjective perception of events, institutions and social relations that are seen as 
important  to  sustaining  their  occupation  and  way  of  life  (an  overview  of  the 
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